


# Border Force

Tackling Metal Theft in  
Containers

An aerial night view of a busy port. The foreground is dominated by a long, straight road or track, illuminated by warm yellow lights. To the left, there are large stacks of colorful shipping containers in shades of red, orange, and white. To the right, a series of large, dark metal gantry cranes with multiple levels and lights extend across the scene. In the background, the port area is filled with more containers and structures, with city lights visible in the distance under a dark blue sky.

Tish Birch  
Customs and National  
Operations  
Border Force

# Introduction

All containers entering and leaving the UK  
(including Scotland and Northern Ireland)  
are controlled and targeted by three  
Border Force Targeting Hubs based at:-

Felixstowe

Southampton

Liverpool

- Containers are targeted from electronically captured manifests.
- A number of electronic profiles can be set to capture high risk traffic.
- The profiles can be set on 30 data elements
- Profiles can be set on a combination of data elements

# These data elements include:-

- Container number
- Exporter
- Importer
- Port of destination (unloading)
- Export post code
- Goods description or commodity code
- Weight

- The target teams can track a container in the UK to port of export
- They can profile it so that they know which port it is being exported from.
- A “hold” can be put onto the container and it cannot be released for export (or import) until we remove the hold

- As in the previous slides Border Force has the data.
- We know how many exports there are from the UK.
- We know who is exporting.
- We know who the importer is.
- We know what is declared at export.
- We know where it is being exported to.

# Issues

- Stolen goods are not an assigned matter for Border Force

# Problems

- We cannot target EU exports as there is no legal requirement to provide an export declaration for EU goods.
- An EU export manifest shows little data and comprises “mainly” of logistic company to logistic company information.
- And “said to contain” (STC)



# Problems

- Border Force can profile any exports from the UK
  - BUT
- We need Information and Intelligence to enable us to profile.

# Problems

- To enable Border Force to profile we need:-
  - Intelligence
  - Names of suspect exporters
    - Country of destination
    - Known “cover loads”
    - Suspect post codes
  - ANYTHING as a starter for 10 !!

# MO Scenarios

- Steal the cable (or any type of metal)
- Put it into a container at a “slaughter site”
- It can be at the dock and exported within hours of the theft.

# Why use containers?


- No-one can see inside a container.
- If stolen metal is placed at the back of a container and a cover load (possibly legitimate scrap metal) put in front of it, the scrap has to come out first.
- There is only one way into the container!!

# Why use Containers?

- A container can carry up to 26 tonnes
- A container export can be hidden in the volume of exports.
- Typically a port such as Felixstowe has a daily through put of 10,000 containers.
- There is no verification of the export declaration against what is in the container.
- And of course the export can be mis-described both for goods and exporter!!

# Why use Containers?

- UNLESS WE TARGET (PROFILE) AND EXAMINE !!
- BUT to do that we need Intelligence and Information.



Thank You

Any Questions?

TRLU

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45G1

MAX. GROSS WEIGHT  
22,000 KG  
NET WEIGHT  
1,800 KG  
GROSS WEIGHT  
20,200 KG  
NET WEIGHT  
1,600 KG

INKU 221480 11  
45G1

MAX. GR